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CHARITABLE LIABILITY FOR TORT
By EDITH L. FiscH*
§ 1. INTRODUCTION - LIABILITY FOR TORT
THE EXTENT to which a charity1 is exempt from tort liability
ranges from complete immunity in a small minority of states to full
liability in others. Still another group of jurisdictions has adopted posi-
tions which reach neither of these two poles, but which are composed
of various gradations and degrees of qualified or limited liability.
The doctrine of full charitable tort immunity was imported into
this country in 1876 by a Massachusetts court, 2 apparently unaware that
the English decision upon which its holding was based had been over-
ruled.' Probably never representative of prevailing American opinion,
this doctrine has been subjected to constant attack. Unfortunately,
however, because legislative and judicial attempts to reach the liability
goal have often emerged as distinctions and qualifications that fall short
of complete abolition, a patchwork of law has been created. Judicial
uncertainty and hesitancy concerning the extent to which immunity
should be retained or eliminated has led to the limitation of liability-
imposing decisions to their specific facts, thereby creating additional
complexities. Occasional legislative reinstatement of immunity after
its judicial extinction4 has also contributed to the scrambling of tort
immunity. Consequently, except for the complete liability and total
immunity states, almost all jurisdictions have developed unique and
* Asst. Prof., New York Law School; A.B., 1945, Brooklyn College; LL.B.,
1948, LL.M., 1949, J.S.D., 1950, Columbia University; Member: N.Y. City Bar, Nat'l
Ass'n of Women Lawyers.
1. For a discussion of the tort liability of a governmental organization see 18
MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 53.01-53.171.
2. McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
3. Holliday v. St. Leonard's, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861). This case had adopted
a dictum from Duncan v. Findlater, 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (1839) which was later repeated
in the Feofees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846) to give damages
out of a trust fund would not be to apply it to those objects whom the author of the
trust had in view, but would be to divert it to a completely different purpose. The
-dictum of Duncan, supra, was overruled by Mersey Docks & Harbour Bd. Trustees
v. Gibbs, 11 Eng. Rep. 1500 (1866) and Holliday, supra, was held to have been over-
ruled by Mersey in Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury, 6 Q.B. 214 (1871). For the
present English position which completely discards charitable immunity see Gilbert v.
Corp. of Trinity House, 17 Q.B. 795 (1886).
4. See § 4 infra, nn.36-39.
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ever-changing variations and differentiations. In some states liability
turns not only upon the status of the injured person in relation to the
charity but also upon the nature of the breach of duty charged5 or the
purpose of the charity.6 In one jurisdiction this last factor is of import-
ance in limiting the amount of recovery.' In several other states execu-
tion of judgments is restricted to certain property held by the charity.'
Broadly categorized, it can be said that six states maintain com-
plete tort immunity ;9 twenty-two states, the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico enforce full liability;1° nineteen states impose varying
degrees of qualified liability;" and three states (Hawaii,'12 New Mexico
and South Dakota) lack determinative decisions. Where it exists the
doctrine of charitable immunity extends to property loss and damages
as well as personal injury.'3
§ 2. COMPLETE IMMUNITY STATES
Today, only six jurisdictions stubbornly adhere to complete chari-
table tort immunity. In Arkansas,' 4 Maine, 5 Massachusetts,'6 Miss-
5. See § 4 infra, nn.40-46.
6. See § 4 infra, nn.33-34, 55-59.
7. See § 4 infra, nn.36-69.
8. See § 4 infra, n.46.
9. See § 2 infra, nn.14-20.
10. See § 3 infra, nn.24-26.
11. See § 4 infra, nn.28-61.
12. See Luhi v. Phoenix Lodge, 31 Haw. 740 (1931) (liability was imposed on
charity when injury resulted from tort occurring on property operated by charity for
profit. Court found it unnecessary to pass upon question of exemption of charity from
liability for tort).
13. McEvoy v. Hartford Hosp., 22 Conn. Sup. 366, 173 A.2d 357 (1961) (hospital
not liable for loss of patient's jewelry).
14. Michael v. St. Paul Mercury Indenn. Co., 92 F. Supp. 140 (D. Ark. 1950)
Helton v. Sisters of Mercy of St. Joseph's Hosp., 351 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1961)
(hospital not liable for injuries to child in course of examination) ; Cabbiness v. City
of North Little Rock, 307 S.W.2d 529 (Ark. 1957) (demurrer to complaint against
boys club operating swimming pool sustained on ground of charitable immunity). Cf.,
Fordyce & McKee v. Woman's Christian Nat. Lia. Ass'n, 79 Ark. 550, 96 S.W. 155(1906) (court stated that property of charity was not subject to execution. The issue
of whether immunity took the form of exemption from suit or exemption of charitable
property from execution upon judgment does not appear to have been directly before
the court).
15. Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 Atl. 898 (1910).
16. Boxer v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, 342 Mass. 537, 174 N.E.2d 363 (1959)
(licensee); Simpson v. Truesdale Hosp., 338 Mass. 787, 154 N.E.2d 357 (1958);
Bearse v. New England Deaconess Hosp., 321 Mass. 750, 72 N.E.2d 743 (1947)
(patient); Reavey v. Guild of St. Agnes, 284 Mass. 300, 187 N.E. 557 (1933)
(employee) ; Foley v. Wesson Memorial Hosp., 246 Mass. 363, 141 N.E. 113 (1923)
(stranger).
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ouri,' 7 Pennsylvania 8 and South Carolina 9 a charity is exempt from
suit for tort by every class of claimant.2 °
Although Arkansas is judicially committed to the full immunity
concept, the rigors of the rule have been somewhat softened by legisla-
tion authorizing a direct action by an injured person against the liability
insurer of an organization not subject to suit for tort.2 1 But because
this law does not require compulsory insurance 22 the charity may ex-
clude its employees,23 or, it would appear, any other group of possible
claimants from coverage.
17. Schulte v. Missionaries of LaSalette Corp., 352 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1961)(charitable religious school not liable for negligence. In adhering to the immunity
doctrine despite the fact that when introduced into this country it was based upon
an overruled English opinion the court remarked that it was "not particularly con-
cerned with the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the brain child of the House of Lords
as expressed in Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 Clark & F. 507." The court also ruled
that the existence of liability insurance does not affect the question of liability);
Kreuger v. Schmiechen, 364 Mo. 568, 264 S.W.2d 311 (1954) (tort action could not
be maintained against members of governing body of church); Stedem v. Jewish
Mem. Hosp. Ass'n of Kansas City, 239 Mo. App. 38, 187 S.W.2d 469 (1945)(beneficiary) ; Whittaker v. St. Luke's Hosp., 137 Mo. App. 116, 117 S.W. 1189
(1909) (employee).
18. Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 409 Pa. 357, 186 A.2d 399 (1962) (pedestrian
injured in front of church) ; Michael v. Hahnemann Med. College & Hosp., 404 Pa.
424, 172 A.2d 769 (1961) (action for negligence to hospital patient) ; Knecht v. St.
Mary's Hosp., 392 Pa. 75, 140 A.2d 30 (1958) (action by patient against hospital) ;
Siidekum v. Animal Rescue League, 353 Pa. 408, 45 A.2d 63 (1946) (stranger). The
Pennsylvania immunity rule was held not to constitute a violation of the due process
and equal protection clauses of the constitution in Weeks v. Children's Hosp. of Phila.,
200 F. Supp. 77 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (action for injury to hospital patient). That charity
has liability insurance does not affect its immunity from suit for tort. Fortagno v.
Trachtenberg, 202 F. Supp. 177 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
19. Vermillion v. Woman's College of Due West, 104 S.C. 197, 88 S.E. 649 (1916)(invitee) ; Lindler v. Columbia Hosp., 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512 (1914) (paying patient).
20. See cases cited supra nn.14-19.
21. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3240 (1959).
22. Ramsey v. Amer. Auto. Insur. Co., 356 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Ark. 1962) (cause
of action "to the extent of the amount or amounts provided for in the insurance policy").
23. Ibid (Salvation Army employee).
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§ 3. COMPLETE LIABILITY STATES
Twenty-two states, 24 the District of Columbia 25 and Puerto Rico
2 6
have completely rejected the doctrine of charitable tort immunity. In
24. Alaska: Moats v. Sisters of Charity of Prov., 13 Alaska 546 (1952).
Arizona: Roman Catholic Church v. Keenan, 74 Ariz. 20, 243 P.2d 455 (1952);
Ray v. Tucson Med. Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951).
California: Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 24 (1951).
Delaware: Durney v. St. Francis Hosp., 46 Del. 350, 83 A.2d 753 (1951).
Florida: Wilson v. Lee Memorial Hosp., 65 So. 2d 40 (1953) (hospital
patient) ; Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344
(1940) (paying patient in hospital).
Idaho: Wheat v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hosp., 78 Idaho 60, 297 P.2d
1041 (1956).
Iowa: Baker v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 129 (D. Iowa 1964) ; Haynes v.
Presbyterian Hosp. Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W.2d 151 (1950).
Kansas: McAtee v. St. Paul's Mission of Maryville, 190 Kan. 518, 376 P.2d
823 (1962) (church corporation) ; Marks v. St. Francis' Hosp. & School of
Nursing, 179 Kan. 268, 294 P.2d 258 (1956) ; Noel v. Menninger Found.,
175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954).
Kentucky: Mullikin v. Jewish Hosp. Ass'n of Louisville, 348 S.W.2d 930
(Ky., 1961); Gillum v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 348 S.W.2d 924 (Ky.,
1961); Hillard v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 348 S.W.2d 939 (Ky., 1961).
Michigan: Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960).
Minnesota: Miller v. Macalester College, 115 N.W.2d 666 (Minn. 1962)
(college) ; Swigerd v. City of Ortonville, 246 Minn. 339, 75 N.W.2d 217
(1956); St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 212 Minn.
558, 4 N.W.2d 637 (1942).
Mississippi: Mississippi Baptist Hosp. v. Holmes, 55 So. 2d 142 (Miss. 1951),
suggestion of error overrules, 56 So. 2d 709 (Miss. 1952).
Montana: Howard v. Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth, 193 F. Supp. 191
(D. Mont. 1961).
Nevada: N~v. REv. STAT. § 41.480 (1961) "No non-profit corporation, associa-
tion or organization shall be immune from liability for the injury or
damage caused any person, firm or corporation, as a result of the negli-
gent or wrongful act of such non-profit corporation, association or organi-
zation, or its agents, employees or servants acting within the scope of
their agency or employment."
New Hampshire: Dowd v. Portsmouth Hosp., 193 A.2d 788 (N.H. 1963);
Wheeler v. Monadnock Comm. Hosp., 103 N.H. 306, 171 A.2d 23 (1961);
Welch v. Frisbie Mem. Hosp., 90 N.H. 337, 9 A.2d 761 (1939).
New York: Favale v. Roosevelt Pub. School Dist. No. 2, 193 N.Y.S.2d 202
(1959); Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 660, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 143 N.E.2d 3
(1957).
North Dakota: Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hosp., 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W.2d
247 (1946).
Oklahoma: Gable v. Salvation Army, 186 Okla. 687, 100 P.2d 244 (1940);
Sisters of Sorrowful Mothers v. Zeidler, 183 Okla. 454, 82 P.2d 996 (1938).
Oregon: Wicklander v. Salem Memorial Hosp., 385 P.2d 617 (Ore 1963) ;
Hungerford v. Portland San. & Benev. Ass'n, 384 P.2d 1009 (Ore. 1963).
Utah: Brigham Young Univ. v. Lillywhite, 118 F.2d 836 (C.A. 10th 1941)
(injury to college student) ; Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hosp.
Ass'n, 94 Utah 460, 78 P.2d 645 (1938).
Vermont: Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Vt., 116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d
230 (1950).
Wisconsin: Widell v. Holy Trinity Catholic Church, 19 Wis. 2d 648, 121
N.W.2d 249 (1963); Duncan v. Steeper, 17 Wis. 2d 226, 116 N.W.2d 154
(1962).
25. President & Dir. of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir.
1942).
26. Puerto Rico Gas & Coke Co. v. Frank Rullan & Associates, 189 F.2d 397 (1st
Cir. 1951) ; Tavarez v. San Juan Lodge, 68 P.R.R. 681 (1948).
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these jurisdictions a charity is subject to suit for tort to the same extent
as any other individual or organization."
§ 4. QUALIFIED LIABILITY STATES
A qualified liability status exists in another nineteen states. In all
but one of these 28 the existence of liability or indemnity insurance has
no significance in determining the liability of the charity.2"
Seven states in this group follow the so-called "beneficiary" rule
only maintaining immunity against a participant, recipient or beneficiary
of the charity if the injury or damage does not result from failure of
the charity to exercise due care in the selection or retention of an
employee. The charity is subject to liability to all other claimants
including employees, invitees and strangers. Phrased differently, chari-
table immunity remains except: (1) where the person injured or dam-
aged is not a beneficiary of the charity and (2) where a beneficiary is
injured as a result of the failure of the charity to exercise due care
in the selection and retention of employees.8 0
27. See cases cited supra nn.24-26. See also Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th
Cir. 1963), reversing 199 F. Supp. 682 (D. Iowa 1962) (church liable for copyright
infringement of musical composition by its choral instructor).
28. See § 4 infra nn.51-54.
29. See e.g. Stoolman v. Camden County Council Boy Scouts, 77 N.J. Super. 129,
185 A.2d 436 (1962) ; Herndon-v. Massey, 217 N.C. 610, 8 S.E.2d 914 (1940) ; Meade
v. St. Francis Hosp., 137 W.Va. 834, 74 S.E.2d 405 (1953).
30. Indiana: Richardson v. St. Mary's Hosp., 191 N.E.2d 337 (Ind. 1963) (paying
patient in hospital) ; St. Vincent's Hosp. v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N.E.
537 (1924) (hospital not liable to paying patient).
Louisiana: Jurjevich v. Hotel Dieu, 11 So. 2d 632 (La. 1943) (charitable
hospital immune from liability for negligence of employee to paying
patient) ; Bougan v. Volunteers of Amer., 151 So. 797 (La. 1934) (charity
liable for negligence of employee in causing injury to stranger). See also
nn.31-33 infra.
Nebraska: Miller v. Concordia Teachers College of Seward, 296 F.2d 100
(8th Cir. 1961) (educational corporation not liable for injuries received
by student shot by intoxicated fellow student. Student was deemed a
beneficiary not an invitee of college) ; Marble v. Nicholas Senn Hosp.
Ass'n of Omaha, 102 Neb. 343, 167 N.W. 208 (1918) (hospital liable to
invitee) ; Duncan v. Nebraska San. Benev. Ass'n, 92 Neb. 162, 137 N.W.
1120 (1912) (paying hospital patient refused recovery).
North Carolina: Williams v. Randolph Hosp., 237 N.C. 387, 75 S.E.2d 303
(1953) (paying patient refused recovery where hospital was not negligent
in selection and retention of employees); Cowans v. North Carolina
Baptist Hosp., 197 N.C. 41, 147 S.E. 672 (1929) (employee may recover
for administrative negligence of charity).
Rhode Island: Basabo v. Salvation Army, 35 R.I. 22, 85 Atl: 120 (1912)
(charity liable for death of stranger run over by its horse and wagon).
R.I. GtN. LAWS § 7-1-22 (1956) provides that no charitable hospital "shall
be liable for the neglect of its officers, agents or employees in the manage-
ment or inmates of such hospital." This statute was held not to violate
the due process or equal protection clauses of the federal constitution in
Fournier v. Miriam Hosp., 175 A.2d 298 (R.I. 1961). Cf. Glavin v. R.I.
Hosp., 12 R.I. 411 (1879) (hospital held liable for injuries to patient).
Virginia: Hill v. Leigh Memorial Hosp., 204 Va. 501, 132 S.E.2d 411 (1963)
(beneficiary of hospital) ; Roanoke Hosp. Ass'n v. Hayes, 204 Va. 703,
133 S.E.2d 559 (1963) (hospital not immune from tort injury to private
FALL 1964]
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Legislation in Louisiana, one of the "beneficiary" rule states,
authorizes a direct action by an injured person against the insurer.8 '
Under this statute, immunity from liability constitutes a personal de-
fense available to the charity but unavailable to the insurer of the
charity,32 and, hence, in this jurisdiction even a beneficiary can maintain
a suit against the insurer.
Six jurisdictions have developed variations or modifications of the
"beneficiary" rule. Ohio, while applying the rule to all other charities,8"
has encroached upon the qualified liability concept by removing non-
profit hospitals from the cloak of immunity 34 on the ground that the
financial capacity of such organizations justifies abolition of special
protection. 5  New Jersey adhered to the "beneficiary" rule36 until
charitable immunity was completely swept away by a series of judicial
decisions in 1958." The legislature, however, promptly revived the
duty practical nurse who was invitee) ; Memorial Hosp. Inc. v. Oakes,
200 Va. 878, 108 S.E.2d 388 (1959) (hospital not liable to paying patient
for negligence of employees) ; Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul v. Thomp-
son, 116 Va. 101, 81 S.E. 13 (1914) (stranger to charitable hospital
entitled to recover).
West Virginia: Meade v. St. Francis Hosp. of Charleston, 137 W.Va. 834,
74 S.E.2d 405 (1953) (charitable hospital not liable to paying patient);
Koehler v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 73 S.E.2d 673 (W.Va. 1952)
(charitable hospital not liable to invitee).
Wyoming: Bishop Randall Hosp. v. Hartley, 24 Wyo. 408, 160 Pac. 385
(1916) (hospital not liable to patient absent negligence in selection and
retention of employees). Although Wyoming appears not to have ex-
pressly passed on charitable liability to persons other than beneficiaries,
from the language of the decision this jurisdiction seems to have adopted
the "beneficiary" rule.
31. LA. REv. STAT. tit. 22 § 655 (1959). For action brought against liability
insurer of church see Juhas v. Amer. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 140 So. 2d 676
(La. 1962).
32. Stamos v. Std. Acc. Ins. Co., 119 F. Supp. 245 (D. La. 1954) (court rules
against insurer who moved to dismiss on ground that insured was a charity and under
Louisiana law not liable for tort damages sustained by beneficiary) ; Humphreys v.
McComiskey, 159 So. 2d 380 (La. 1964) ; D'Antoni v. Sara Mayo Hosp., 144 So. 2d
643 (La. 1962) (suit by patient against insurer and hospital); Lusk v. U.S.F. & G.
Co., 199 So. 666 (La. 1941).
33. Sturdevant v. Youngstown Dist. Girl Scout Council, Inc., 195 N.E.2d 914
(Ohio 1962) (action by beneficiary against girl scout council) ; Matthews v. Witten-
berg College, 178 N.E.2d 526 (Ohio 1960) (nonprofit religious institution of learning
not liable for injury to student absent failure of institution to exercise due care in
selection and retention of employee) ; Bell v. Salvation Army, 169 N.E.2d 636 (Ohio
1960) (paying beneficiary); Gibbon v. Y.W.C.A., 170 Ohio St. 280, 164 N.E.2d 563
(1960), reversing 159 N.E.2d 911 (1959) (recovery in wrongful death action arising
from drowning of decedent in swimming pool maintained by defendant denied);
Hunsche v. Alter, 76 Ohio L. Abs. 68, 145 N.E.2d 368 (1957) (nonprofit religious
organization).
34. Jones v. Hawkes Hosp. of Mt. Carmel, 196 N.E.2d 592 (Ohio 1964); Klema
v. St. Eliz. Hosp. of Youngstown, 166 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1960) ; Avellone v. St. John's
Hosp., 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956) ; Andrews v. Youngstown Osteopathic
Hosp., 147 N.E. 645 (Ohio 1956).
35. Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., supra n.34.
36. Rose v. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan, etc. Foundation, 136 N.J.L. 553, 57
A.2d 29 (1948).
37. Dalton v. St. Luke's Catholic Church, 27 N.J. 22, 141 A.2d 273 (1958);
Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infr., 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958); Benton v.
Y.M.C.A., 27 N.J. 67, 141 A.2d 298 (1958).
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"beneficiary" rule38 with a limited modification sanctioning liability up
to $10,000 to a beneficiary of a charitable hospital.39
Three other states, Connecticut,4" Indiana41 and Texas,42 have
eroded the "beneficiary" rule to the extent of imposing liability where
the charity negligently exercises or breaches a non-delegable duty such
as the selection or supplying of proper equipment or facilities for the
carrying out of the charitable purpose.43 Thus a hospital has been held
liable to a patient for burns caused by an improvised heat cradle" and
for injuries resulting from the injection of a deleterious solution.45
Qualification of liability in Colorado, Illinois and Tennessee takes
the form of immunity of charitable assets rather than immunity from
38. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:53A-7 (1959). See Anasiewicz v. Sacred Heart Church
of New Brunswick, 74 N.J. Super. 532, 181 A.2d 787 (1962) (invited wedding guest
held to be beneficiary of church).
39. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:53A-8 (1959). This statute was construed in Stoolman
v. Camden County Council Boy Scouts, 77 N.J. Super. 129, 185 A.2d 436 (1962) (boy
scout council not liable for negligence to cut scout) ; Makar v. St. Nicholas Church,
78 N.J. Super. 1, 187 A.2d 353 (1963) (statute held constitutional in personal injury
action by parishioner against church); Mayer v. Fairlawn Jewish Center, 71 N.J.
Super. 313, 177 A.2d 40 (1961), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on another ground,
38 N.J. 549, 186 A.2d 274 (1962) (plaintiff present at religious social center in his
capacity as employee of another organization found to be invitee and not beneficiary).
40. McEvoy v. Hartford Hosp., 22 Conn. Sup. 366, 173 A.2d 357 (1961) (hospital
not liable to patient for loss of jewelry absent "corporate negligence"); Berube v.
Salvation Army, 21 Conn. Sup. 487, 157 A.2d 493 (1960) (visitor to premises allowed
to recover); Martino v. Grace-New Haven Community Hosp., 146 Conn. 735, 148
A.2d 259 (1959) (patient refused recovery where hospital was not negligent in selec-
tion of employees) ; Coolbaugh v. St. Peter's Roman Catholic Church of Bridgeport,
142 Conn. 536, 115 A.2d 662 (1955) (parishoner in attendance at church who was
injured by wire on church lawn held not an invitee and thus unable to recover where
religious corporation had not been negligent in selection of sexton).
41. Ball Memorial Hosp. v. Freeman, 196 N.E.2d 274 (Ind. 1964). For other
applications of beneficiary theory holding hospital not liable to paying patient see,
Richardson v. St. Mary's Hosp., 191 N.E.2d 337 (Ind. 1963) ; St. Vincent's Hosp. v.
Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N.E. 537 (1924).
42. Goelz v. J.K. & Susie L. Wadley Research Inst. & Blood Bank, 350 S.W.2d
573 (Tex. 1961) (research institute and blood bank not liable for negligence of its
employees) ; Penaloza v. Baptist Memorial Hosp., 304 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1957)(hospital not liable to patient for negligence of nurse) ; Felan v. Lucey, 259 S.W.2d
302 (Tex. 1953) (liability imposed upon archbishop who as trustee had title to
Catholic cemetery as against a visitor injured by fall of monument) ; Southern Metho-
dist Univ. v. Clayton, 167 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. 1944) (charity liable to employee) ; Hotel
Dieu v. Armendarez, 210 S.W. 518 (Tex. 1919) (charity liable for negligent selection
and retention of agent).
43. Medical & Surgical Memorial Hosp. v. Cauthorn, 229 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1949)(hospital liable to patient for injuries caused by improvised heat cradle) ; Sullivan v.
Sisters of St. Francis, 374 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. 1963) (summary judgment denied when
defendant failed to show that death did not result from "administrative negligence") ;
Bader v. United Orthodox Synagogue, 148 Conn. 449, 172 A.2d 192 (1961) (failure
to provide porch railings). Cf. Killen v. Brazoport Memorial Hosp., 364 S.W.2d 411(Tex. 1963) (failure to promulgate a written safety rule requiring use of warning
signs when mopping floor was not a breach of non-delegable duties since the duty
of supervision of cleaning personnel, and establishing procedures for them might
be delegated to a director of housekeeping personnel).
44. Medical and Surgical Memorial Hosp. v. Cauthorn, supra n.43.
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suit.46 In these jurisdictions a charity is not immune from suit for tort,
and liability extends to all classes of persons. "Charitable property,"
however, is exempt from execution upon a judgment while insurance
funds or other non-trust property may be levied upon.47
In Georgia the modification of the "beneficiary" theory takes the
form of allowing the beneficiary to recover to the extent of liability
insurance carried by the charity not only where there has been negli-
gence in the employment or retention of incompetent employees,4" but
also where there has been no failure to use such care.49 Absent adminis-
trative negligence or insurance the charity is immune from suit for
tort by a beneficiary.5°
Judicial interpretation of legislation in Maryland has cut into the
immunity rule. A statute in that jurisdiction requires a policy issued
to cover the liability of any charitable institution for negligence or any
other tort to provide that "the insurer shall be estopped from asserting,
as a defense to any claim covered by said policy, that such institution is
immune from liability on the ground that it is a charitable institution."'"
Since this has been judicially interpreted as prohibiting a direct action
against the insurer,5 2 it became necessary, in order to make this legisla-
tion meaningful, to construe it as estopping the insured from asserting
immunity as a defense - to the extent of the collectible insurance. 53
Thus the full immunity from suit which ordinarily applies in Maryland54
is inapplicable to a charity carrying liability insurance; the existence
of such insurance in effect destroys charitable immunity.
When in 1953 a charitable hospital was held liable for an injury
to a paying patient resulting from the negligence of a nurse by a decision
which extensively discussed the immunity rationale and proclaimed
46. Colorado: Michard v. Myron Stratton Home, 355 P.2d 1078 (Colo. 1960);
St. Luke's Hosp. Ass'n v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P.2d 917 (1952);
O'Connor v. Boulder Colo. San. Ass'n, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P.2d 835 (1939).
Illinois: Tidwell v. Smith, 169 N.E.2d 157 (Ill. 1960) ; Moore v. Moyle, 405
Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950).
Tennessee: Spivey v. St. Thomas Hosp., 31 Tenn. App. 12, 211 S.W.2d 450
(1947) (hospital patient); Anderson v. Armstrong, 180 Tenn. 56, 171
S.W.2d 401 (1943); McLeod v. St. Thomas Hosp., 170 Tenn. 423, 95
S.W.2d 917 (1936) (stranger).
47. See cases cited supra n.46.
48. Cox v. De Jarnette, 104 Ga. App. 662, 123 S.E.2d 16 (1961).
49. Y.M.C.A. v. Bailey, 107 Ga. App. 417, 130 S.E.2d 242 (1963) ; Hipp v. Hos-
pital Auth. of City of Marietta, 104 Ga. App. 174, 121 S.E.2d 273 (1961) (hospital
negligent in selecting orderly with criminal record as a peeping tom held liable to
paying patient for his torts).
50. Hospital Auth. of City of Marietta v. Misfeldt, 99 Ga. App. 702, 109 S.E.2d
816 (1959) ; Executive Comm. of Baptist Cony. v. Ferguson, 95 Ga. App. 393, 98
S.E.2d 50 (1957), rev'd on another ground, 213 Ga. 441, 99 S.E.2d 150 (1959) ; Morton
v. Savannah Hosp., 148 Ga. 438, 96 S.E. 887 (1918).
51. MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 85 (1957).
52. Gorman v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 210 Md. 1, 121 A.2d 812 (1956).
53. State v. Arundel Park Corp., 218 Md. 484, 147 A.2d 427 (1959).
54. Cornelius v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 219 Md. 116, 148 A.2d 567 (1959).
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that "court-declared policy" of that state invalid" it appeared that
Washington had banished the immunity doctrine.56 Two years later,
however, in Lyon v. Tuinwater Evangelical Free Church,5 7 the same
court held that a nonprofit religious organization which transported
children by bus to Sunday school without charge was immune from
liability for injury to a child caused by the alleged negligence of the bus
driver. In reaching its decision the court stated that the rule of chari-
table immunity had not been rejected but merely modified to the extent
of permitting a paying patient in a charitable hospital to recover for
injuries caused by the negligence of its employees.
The Lyon decision unfortunately introduced into the law of this
jurisdiction a distinction based upon the nature of the charity com-
mitting the tort. In 1961 a Washington court again applied the doc-
trine of charitable immunity to a religious organization" basing its
decision on the ground that the plaintiff had accepted the immunity
doctrine. The court did state, however, that "were that doctrine chal-
lenged, this court might be inclined to re-evaluate it, but we cannot prop-
erly decide the case upon an issue which has not been raised or argued."5
In Alabama a charity is liable for its torts to its employees, invitees
and paying beneficiaries."0  The issue of liability to a non-paying bene-
ficiary is still open.61
§ 5. EXCULPATORY CLAUSES
Judicial elimination of charitable immunity brought with it at-
tempts to circumvent the rule by contract. In one case this took the
form of a release from liability for future negligence imposed as a
condition for admission to a charitable research hospital. This excul-
patory provision which exempted the hospital "from any and all liability
for the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of its employees if the
hospital has used due care in selecting its employees" was declared
invalid as contrary to public policy. The court explained that:
the integrated and specialized society of today, structured upon
mutual dependency, cannot rigidly narrow the concept of the public
55. Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp., 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P.2d 765(1953).
56. See Jeffrey v. Whitworth College, 128 F. Supp. 219, 225 (D. Wash. 1955)
stating that in Washington a charitable corporation no longer enjoys immunity for
damages in tort.
57. 47 Wash. 2d 202, 287 P.2d 128 (1955).
58. Pederson v. Immanuel Lutheran Church, 358 P.2d 549 (Wash. 1961) (church).
Cf. Haugen v. Central Lutheran Church, 361 P.2d 637 (Wash. 1961) where the defense
of charitable immunity appears not to have been urged.
59. Pedersen v. Immanuel Lutheran Church, supra n.58, at 549-50.
60. Baptist Hosp. v. Carter, 226 Ala. 109, 145 So. 443 (1933), aff'd, 227 Ala. 560,
151 So. 62 (1933) (invitee) ; Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4
(1915).
61. Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, supra n.60.
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interest. From the observance of simple standards of due care in
the driving of a car to the performance of the high standards of
hospital practice, the individual citizen must be completely de-
pendent upon the responsibility of others. The fabric of this pat-
tern is so closely woven that the snarling of a single thread affects
the whole. We cannot lightly accept a sought immunity from care-
less failure to provide the hospital service upon which many must
depend. Even if the hospital doors were open only to those in a
specialized category, the hospital cannot claim isolated immunity
in the interdependent community of our time. It too, is part of the
social fabric, and prearranged exculpation from its negligence must
partly rend the pattern and necessarily affect the public interest.0 2
§ 6. CHARITABLE CHARACTER OF ALLEGED
TORTFEASOR
While immunity from tort does not turn upon whether the party
seeking this status is a corporation, trust or unincorporated associa-
tion,6" charitable character constitutes an affirmative defense that must
be alleged and proved in the same manner as any other fact."4 The
burden of proof is upon the one asserting that defense,6" and unless
established, immunity will not be granted.66 The charter, articles of
association or declaration of trust showing an organization to be chari-
table in its creation and powers is prima facie evidence of its charitable
purpose,67 and, because it is presumed that a charity operates in accord-
ance with its stated purposes,6" unless evidence to the contrary is intro-
62. Tunkl. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441 (1963).
63. Widell v. Holy Trinity Catholic Church, 19 Wis. 2d 648, 121 N.W.2d 249
(1963) (corporation) ; Cox v. De Jarnette, 104 Ga. App. 664, 123 S.E.2d 16 (1961)
(trust) ; Felan v. Lucey, 259 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. 1953) (trust) ; Herndon v. Massey,
217 N.C. 610, 8 S.E.2d 914 (1940) (unincorporated association).
64. Grueninger v. Pres. & Fellows of Harvard College, 178 N.E.2d 917 (Mass.
1961) (charitable immunity is an affirmative defense and hence complaint is not open
to demurrer) ; Olson v. River View Cemetery Ass'n, 349 P.2d 279 (Ore. 1960);
Rivera v. Misericordia Hosp., 15 Wis. 2d 351, 112 N.W.2d 918 (1962) ; Cf. Bell v.
Salvation Army, 172 Ohio St. 326, 175 N.E.2d 738 (1961) (court judicially noticed
charitable character of Salvation Army). For a discussion of the factors that enter
into charitable character see § 6.
65. Barrett v. Brooks Hosp., Inc., 338 Mass. 754, 157 N.E.2d 638 (Mass. 1959)
Ackerman v. Physicians and Surgeons Hosp., 298 P.2d 1026 (Ore. 1956).
66. Lichty v. Carbon County Agr. Ass'n, 31 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1940) (agri-
cultural association) ; Allison v. Mennonite Publications Bd., 123 F. Supp. 23 (W.D.
Pa. 1954) (nonprofit corporation established to own a church publication house in
libel action) ; Ackerman v. Physicians & Surgeons Hosp., 207 Ore. 646, 298 P.2d 1026
11956) (hospital) ; Busch v. Aiken Elec. Corp., Inc., 226 S.C. 442, 85 S.E.2d 716
1955) (rural electric cooperative) ; Grossett Health Center v. Croswell, 256 S.W.2d
48 (Ark. 1953).
67. Maretick v. So. Chicago Comm. Hosp., 297 Ill. App. 488, 17 N.E.2d 1012
(1938); Boxer v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, 174 N.E.2d 363 (Mass. 1961),
modifying, 339 Mass. 369, 159 N.E.2d 336 (1959); Barrett v. Brooks Hosp., Inc.,
338 Mass. 754, 157 N.E.2d 638 (1959); Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hosp.
Ass'n, 89 Utah 222, 51 P.2d 229 (1935); Rivera v. Misericordia Hosp., 15 Wis. 2d 351,
112 N.W.2d 918 (1962) (articles of incorporation not conclusive).
68. Memorial Hosp. v. Oakes, 200 Va. 878, 108 S.E.2d 388 (1959).
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1964], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol10/iss1/3
CHARITABLE LIABILITY FOR TORT
duced, the affirmative defense may be established by the introduction
of these documents.6" Generally, however, such proof does not preclude
the opponent from introducing evidence as to charitable status since this
issue is determined not alone by the powers and purposes of an organi-
zation but also by the manner in which it is conducted. Hence, the
opponent is entitled to present evidence showing the true character of
the institution by revealing the nature of its operations.7"
Self denomination by a party as a hospital, orphan home or
memorial association does not dispense with the necessity for proof of
charitable character since such organizations are not per se charitable,71
nor is the granting of tax exemption by the state or federal govern-
ment conclusive.72
§ 7. EXCEPTIONS FROM IMMUNITY - UNRELATED
PROFIT MAKING ACTIVITIES
Excepted from immunity are those torts which occur on property
owned and operated by a charity for profit, or which arise out of an
activity carried on by a charity for profit.7' As sometimes phrased, a
charity is not immune from tort liability where the activity out of which
the alleged liability arose is not directly related to the charitable pur-
pose for which the charity was organized. 74
Apart from the established ruling that devotion of all profits to its
charitable purposes does not constitute the required direct connection, 75
the activities which fall within the stated test depend upon the facts in
each case.76 Conduct of a bingo game by a religious organization,77
69. Ibid.
70. Krpan v. Otis Elev. Co., 226 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (charter showing
defendant to be nonprofit corporation is not sufficient to warrant summary judgment)
Southern Methodist Hosp. & San. v. Wilson, 45 Ariz. 507, 46 P.2d 118 (1935)
Eiserhardt v. State A. & M. Soc. of S.C., 11 S.E.2d 568 (S.C. 1959); Memorial
Hosp. v. Oakes, 200 Va. 878, 108 S.E.2d 388 (1959). Cf. Maretick v. So. Chicago
Comm. Hosp., 297 Ill. App. 488, 17 N.E.2d 1012 (1938).
71. See cases cited supra n.66. See also Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial
Hosp. Ass'n, 89 Utah 222, 51 P.2d 229 (1935).
72. Krpan v. Otis Elev. Co., 226 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
73. Grueninger v. Pres. & Fellows of Harvard College, 178 N.E.2d 917 (Mass.
1961) (allegation that activities giving rise to injury were primarily commercial
sufficient) ; Reavey v. Guild of St. Agnes, 284 Mass. 300, 187 N.E. 557 (1933) ; Bell
v. Salvation Army, 172 Ohio St. 326, 175 N.E.2d 738 (1961) (allegation that defen-
dant operated hotel for profit sufficient against demurrer) ; Rhodes v. Millsops College,
179 Miss. 596, 176 So. 253 (1937). Also see cases cited infra nn.75-81.
74. Blatt v. Geo. H. Nettleton Home for Aged Women, 365 Mo. 30, 275 S.W.2d
344 (1955).
75. Ibid.
76. Klopp v. Benev. Protective Order, 309 Ill. App. 145, 33 N.E.2d 161 (1941)
(organization which dispensed intoxicating liquor under dramshop license liable for
tort) ; Carpenter v. Y.M.C.A., 324 Mass. 365, 86 N.E.2d 634 (1949) (operation of
playground and payment of small fee for supervising play of plaintiff did not render
defendant liable for tort). Also see cases cited infra nn.77-81.
77. Blankenship v. Alter, 171 Ohio St. 65, 167 N.E.2d 922 (1960).
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operation of a parking lot as a commercial venture by an agricultural
and mechanical society7" and operation of an office building by a
charity79 have subjected the charity to liability for injuries occurring on
the property or arising out of the profit-making activity even though the
proceeds have been devoted to charitable objectives. On the other hand,
the sale of religious articles at a profit by a church using the proceeds
for religious purposes did not result in removal of its immunity."0 Nor
did the imposition of a small fee to attend a luncheon in the church ren-
der it liable to a member of the ladies aid society injured at the luncheon
where the payment constituted a contribution to church purposes."'
§ 8. TORT AS A DEFENSE
Even in a jurisdiction granting immunity the commission of a tort
by a charity may be established as a defense. A patient sued by a
hospital8 2 for board, room and attendance was thus permitted to show
that he was severely burned as a result of the negligence of the hospital
employees, in order to prove that the services of the hospital were of
no value. This was permissible even though the defendant could not
have instituted suit against the hospital for negligence.83
§ 9. NUISANCE
A charity can be subjected to an injunction or to liability for
damages as a result of the creation or maintenance of a nuisance,84 even
where the nuisance arises out of negligence.85
Whether the tort constitutes negligence or nuisance, while often
difficult to determine, is of importance in those jurisdictions where tort
exemption remains since the successful framing of a complaint in nuis-
ance rather than negligence results in avoidance of the immunity
rulings. This is clearly revealed by comparing Smith v. Congregation
78. Eiserhardt v. State Agric. & Mech. Soc. of S.C., 111 S.E.2d 568 (S.C. 1959).
79. Blatt v. Geo. H. Nettleton Home for Aged Women, 365 Mo. 30, 275 S.W.2d
344 (1955) ; Gamble v. Vanderbilt Univ., 138 Tenn. 616,.200 S.W. 510 (1918).
80. Cullen v. Schmidt, 139 Ohio St. 194, 39 N.E.2d 146 (1942).
81. Pedersen v. Immanuel Lutheran Church, 358 P.2d 549 (Wash. 1961).
82. Beverly Hosp. v. Early, 292 Mass. 201, 197 N.E. 641 (1935).
83. Ibid.
84. Kestner v. Homopathic Medical & Surgical Hosp., 245 Pa. 326, 91 Att. 659
(1914) (injunction granted against hospital); Peden v. Furman Univ., 155 S.C. 1,
151 S.E. 907 (1930) (error to have directed verdict for defendant in suit for damages
and to enjoin it from using its athletic field for sports purposes when field was too
small and resulted in balls being batted on to plaintiff's premises) ; Love v. Nashville
Agr. & Normal Inst., 146 Tenn. 550, 243 S.W. 304 (1922) (nuisance arising out of
contamination of plaintiff's well by sewage of charity enjoined and damages imposed) ;
Smith v. Cong. of St. Rose, 265 Wis. 393, 61 N.W.2d 896 (1953) (injury to stranger
caused by icy sidewalk).
85. Smith v. Cong. of St. Rose, supra n.84.
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of St. Rose,"0 with Fields v. Mountainside Hospital.7 In the former
case a stranger who fell on ice caused by the overflow of water to the
sidewalk was permitted to recover on the basis of nuisance in main-
taining a clogged water spout; in the latter the use of defective medical
apparatus and equipment was found not to constitute a nuisance in a
suit by a paying patient against a hospital, leaving the plaintiff without
a remedy in tort.
§ 10. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS
It frequently becomes important to determine whether the em-
ployees of a charity are covered by a workmen's compensation act. To
the extent that the act either expressly includes or excludes charitable
employees the problems of cqverage are ameliorated.
In Georgia the employees of institutions maintained and operated
as public charities are specifically excluded ;88 while in Idaho employ-
ment by a charitable organization is not within the act unless coverage
is elected by the employer.89 In Arkansas, institutions maintained and
operated wholly as public charities are excluded.9" The New York act
excepts a clergyman, sexton, christian science reader or member of a
religious order, as well as persons "engaged in a professional or teaching
capacity in or for a religious, charitable or educational institution."'"
Other statutes expressly include charities. The Massachusetts act
specifically includes "laborers, workmen and mechanics employed by
religious, charitable or educational institutions."92 Hospitals, public
service, eleemosynary, religious or charitable corporations or associa-
tions engaged in extra hazardous enterprises or businesses are included
in Illinois.9
A statute which expressly excludes a particular charitable rela-
tionship from the scope of the word "employee" is generally construed
as including the area not excluded. 4
86. Ibid. Cf. Cox v. DeJarnette, 104 Ga. App. 669, 123 S.E.2d 16 (1961) (slippery
condition of steps and landing when wet with rain did not constitute a nuisance).
87. 22 N.J. Misc. 72, 35 A.2d 701 (1944).
88. GA. CODE ANN. § 114.07 (1956).
89. IDAHO CODE § 72-105A (1959).
90. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1302 (1960).
91. N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP. LAW § 201(5) (McKinney, 1963). Also excepted
are "volunteers in or for a religious, charitable or educational institution, or persons
participating in and receiving rehabilitative service in a sheltered workshop" or
recipients of charitable aid from a religious or charitable institution or who performs
work in return for aid.
92. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 152 § 1(4) (1958). See In re Brewer's Case, 141
N.E.2d 281 (Mass. 1957) (act held applicable to student nurse who paid tuition to
charitable hospital but worked at hospital for room and board).
93. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 48, § 138.1 (Smith-Hurd, 1962).
94. See CAL. LABOR LAW § 3352 excluding as "employee" a person performing
services in return for aid or sustenance only, received from any religious, charitable
or relief organization. This statute was unsuccessfully invoked by the employer in
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Absent express inclusion or exclusion, whether a workmen's com-
pensation act occupies the whole field or was intended to exclude
charities, raises a problem of statutory construction. 5 The legislature
is generally found to have intended inclusion of charities in those juris-
dictions in which a charity is not exempt from tort liability to its
employees.9" Injuries sustained by a minister employed by a church, 97
an inmate employed by the Salvation Army s and an excavation worker
employed by a church association 9 have been held compensable in
these jurisdictions.
In states where a charity is exempted from liability for negligence
to its employees the courts are sharply divided. South Carolina'00 and
Washington' 0' have concluded that a charity does not come within the
act absent a plain legislative intention to change the rules exempting it
from tort liability to its employees. Missouri has taken the opposite
position on the theory that the act "is not merely cumulative to or
supplemental of the common law and existing statutes, but rather creates
entirely new rights and remedies, regardless of whether they may have
existed theretofore or not.' 0 2 Both Tennessee'03 and Pennsylvania'
have similarly held that if it were intended to exclude charities from
the workmen's compensation law the legislature would have made this
intention expressly known.
Thus, although holdings can be found in some immunity states
denying coverage by the workmen's compensation act, the majority of
states having acts that do not expressly include charities have reached
a contrary conclusion. The majority rule is better reasoned; compen-
sation acts have substituted a different system of statutory law for the
common law tort theory. The limits of compensation are not restricted
State Subsequent Injuries Fund v. Indus. Acc. Comm., 16 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1961)(finding bona fide employment relationship).
95. Caughman v. Columbia Y.M.C.A., 212 S.C. 337, 47 S.E.2d 788 (1948).
96. Hartford Acc. & Ins. Co. v. Dept. of Ind. Relations, 139 Cal. App. 632, 34
P.2d 826 (1934) (dictum). See also cases cited infra nn.97-99.
97. Taylo" v. St. Paul's Universalist Church, 109 Conn. 178, 145 Ati. 887 (1929);
Meyers v. S.W. Region Conf. Ass'n of Seventh Day Adventists, 230 La. 310, 88
So. 2d 381 (1956) reversing 79 So. 2d 595 (1955).
98. Schneider v. Salvation Army, 217 Minn. 448, 14 N.W.2d 467 (1944).
99. Gardner v. Trustees of Main St. Methodist E. Church, 217 Iowa 1390, 250
N.W. 740 (1933).
100. Caughman v. Columbia Y.M.C.A., 212 S.C. 337, 47 S.E.2d 788 (1948).
101. Thurston County Chapter, Amer. Nat. Red Cross v. Dept. of Labor and Ind.
of Wash., 166 Wash. 488, 7 P.2d 577 (1932) (Red Cross not employer within work-
men's compensation act).
102. Hope v. Barnes Hosp., 227 Mo. App. 1058, 55 S.E.2d 319 (1932) (death of
hospital employee held compensable).
103. Smith v. Lincoln Memorial Univ., 304 S.W.2d 70 (Tenn. 1957) (charitable
educational institution not exempt from workmen's compensation act).
104. Schreckengost v. Gospel Tabernacle, 188 Pa. Super. 652, 149 A.2d 542 (1959)(deceased who performed services for church was within workmen's compensation act).
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by the limits of tort liability."°5 This has been clearly explained by a
Missouri court which has pointed out that the act "creates entirely new
rights and remedies, regardless of whether they may have existed
theretofore or not. For instance, as a basic proposition, the act affords
a right and a remedy to an employee for an injury occasioned without
wrong, human fault, or negligence, while at common law an injury
received in that manner was neither actionable nor remedial. It also
affords him a right and a remedy under circumstances where the em-
ployer though himself at fault would have had a complete defense at com-
mon law. Consequently, the employer is incorrect in its assertion that
because the claimant, without the act would have had no cause of action,
he can be accorded no right and remedy pursuant to its provisions."10
Where a workmen's compensation act provides for the election of
its provisions by an employer, a charitable employee becomes covered
by the act when his employer accepts its provisions.1 °7
§ 11. PERSONAL LIABILITY OF TRUSTEE, DIRECTOR,
MANAGER AND EMPLOYEE FOR TORT
To what extent is a trustee of a charitable trust or a director,
manager, employee or agent of a charitable corporation or association
individually liable for a tort committed in the administration of the
charity ?o' Tort immunity does not extend to the members of govern-
ing boards or other employees of a charitable corporation in their in-
dividual capacities.10 9 Similarly, while the charitable immunity doctrine
105. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 50.43 (1952).
106. Hope v. Barnes Hosp., 227 Mo. App. 1058, 55 S.E.2d 319 (1932).
107. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 618 (1959) (a charitable, religious, educational or
other corporation, institution, association, partnership or individual engaged in a busi-
ness, trade or occupation which is not carried on for the sake of pecuniary gain, may
voluntarily come within the provisions of this chapter). See also Calvert v. Ill. Power
& Light Corp., 291 Il1. App. 243, 9 N.E.2d 443 (1937) ; Monteleone v. Center Storage
Warehouse, Inc., 68 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1946).
108. See Note, Liability of Supervisory Employees, 38 ORE. L. REv. 350 (1959).
109. Hinman v. Berkman, 85 F. Supp. 2 (D. Mo. 1949); Roberts v. Kirksville
College of Osteopathy & Surgery, 16 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. 1929) ; O'Neilly v. Odd
Fellows Home of Oregon, 89 Ore. 382, 174 Pac. 148 (1918) ; See Helton v. Sisters of
Mercy of St. Joseph's Hosp., 351 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1961); Rivera v. Misericordia
Hosp., 15 Wis. 2d 251, 112 N.W.2d 918 (1962) (hospital employee) ; Cf. Latell v.
Walsh, 181 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio 1961) (bishop of diocese and pastor of church were
sued individually as persons having control of church premises by member who was
injured when he fell over guardwall on church premises. Judgment in favor of defen-
dants was affirmed on the ground that "where a trustee of a religious charitable
eleemosynary organization is sued individually for negligence and the acts or omissions
upon which the claim is based were his duty or obligation only because of his position
as such trustee, the immunity given to the church attaches to his individual act or
omission unless it can be shown that there was such an act, or such an omission, as
to amount to a violation of the trust." The court commented that imposition of "a
personal duty upon the trustee of church property to eliminate from such properties
all possible dangerous situations would be unreasonable and would defeat the immunity
from suits by beneficiaries normally enjoyed by the religious organization").
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precludes suit against a trustee in his representative capacity," ° a trustee
may be individually liable for his personal misconduct."'
While liable for acts of misfeasance or malfeasance, 1 2 trustees,
executive officers and members of the governing board of a charity are
not responsible for nonfeasance,"' or, in modern phraseology, for torts
in which they did not participate." 4 Thus members of the executive
committee of an incorporated university were individually liable for per-
mitting use of an elevator with knowledge of its defective condition,"'
while the trustees of an incorporated hospital were excused from respon-
sibility for injuries sustained in a similar manner absent evidence of
their negligence either by commission or omission." 6
Only those trustees or members of the board who are personally
at fault are subject to liability.1 7
§ 12. CONFLICT OF LAWS AND LAW APPLICABLE
IN FEDERAL COURTS
Traditionally the existence and nature of tortious liability is deter-
mined by the law of the place of the wrong,"" and, hence, the issue of
charitable immunity is generally governed by the law of the jurisdiction
in which the tort occurred."' That the charity was organized in a state
other than the one in which the tort was committed has, therefore, been
found to be without significance in determining the applicable law.' 20
The usual rule, however, has not been applied where a strong
public policy against the maintenance of such an action exists in the
110. Burgess v. James, 73 Ga. App. 857, 38 S.E.2d 637 (1946).
111. St. Mary's Academy v. Soloman, 77 Colo. 463, 238 Pac. 22 (1925) ; Pease
v. Parsons, 273 Mass. 111, 173 N.E. 406 (1930). See, Note, Tort Liability of the
Trustee of a Charitable Trust: A Qualified Immunity, 44 VA. L. Rxv. 1317 (1958).
112. Pease v. Parsons, 259 Mass. 86, 156 N.E. 4 (1930); Scott v. Burton, 173
Tenn. 148, 114 S.W.2d 956 (1938).
113. Eads v. Y.W.C.A., 325 Mo. 577, 29 S.W.2d 701 (1930) (members of board
of trustees not individually liable when employee sustained injuries while operating
elevator).
114. Paterline v. Memorial Hosp. Ass'n of Monongahela City, 247 Fed. 639 (3rd
Cir. 1918), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 665 (1918) (directors of incorporated hospital not
individually liable for death of patient by accidental poisoning, absent proof showing
an act of commission or omission) ; Scott v. Burton, 173 Tenn. 148, 114 S.W.2d 956(1938) (members of board of trustees of incorporated college held not individually
liable for injuries sustained by student in jumping from dormitory during a fire, absent
proof that the trustees knew of accumulation of trash which caused fire. Court stated
that it did not make distinction between misfeasance and malfeasance the basis of
its decision). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 402.
115. Gamble v. Vanderbilt Univ., 138 Tenn. 616, 200 S.W. 510 (1918).
116. Simon v. Pelouze, 263 Ill. App. 177 (1931).
117. Pease v. Parsons, 273 Mass. 111, 173 N.E. 406 (1930).
118. Jeffrey v. Whitworth College, 128 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Wash. 1955) ; Allison
v. Mennonite Pub. Bd., 123 F. Supp. 23 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
119. Hooten v. Civil Air Patrol, 161 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Wis. 1958) ; Matute v.
Carson Long Inst., 160 F. Supp. 827 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
120. Keffrey v. Whitworth College, 128 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Wash. 1955) (law
of Idaho where tort occurred held to govern rather than law or forum where college
was organized).
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state of the forum court, and here the immunity rule will be applied.121
It also appears that since the decision of Babcock v. Jackson,12  in 1963,
New York has abandoned the "place of tort" theory in favor of the
"grouping of contacts" doctrine in cases involving a choice of law in
tort litigation. In Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 12 decided
prior to Babcock, the traditional test was applied and the law of the
place of the wrong was held to govern where a charity organized under
the law of the forum, operated as a foreign corporation in the state
where the tort occurred. That Babcock broadly changed this rule is
revealed by Blum v. American Youth Hostels, Inc.,124 where on facts
similar to those in Kaufman, the court held that the law of the foreign
state where the tort occurred could not be used as a defense to plaintiff's
action. In so holding the court found that Babcock "discarded the
inflexible rule that substantive rights and liabilities are invariably
determined by the law of the place of the tort," and noted that the "issue
here as in Babcock v. Jackson ... is not whether defendant violated
some standard of conduct imposed by the law of Oregon, but whether
defendant because of its status in that state is immune from liability.
As to the issue of immunity, it is New York which has the superior
claim for the application of its law; the place where the plaintiffs resided
and defendant was incorporated; where their relationship arose and
where the trip began and was to end, rather than Oregon, the place
where the accident occurred." 1 25
Federal courts follow local state law in determining liability,'26
and may look to decisions in other jurisdictions where the state whose
law is determinative has not passed upon the question. 2 7
§ 13. VALIDITY AND FUTURE OF IMMUNITY RULE
The immunity rule, in those states in which it still adheres, is
based on one or more of four theories, each of which has been severely
attacked by the courts of some states and vigorously defended by those
121. Menardi v. Thea. Jones Evang. Ass'n, 154 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
122. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
123. 6.A.D.2d 223, 177 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1958), modified, 5 N.Y.2d 1016, 158 N.E.2d
128 (1959) (New York court applied Oregon rule of immunity to corporation organ-
ized in New York. In so holding the court rejected the rationale of Heinemann v.
Jewish Agr. Soc., 178 Misc. 897, 37 N.Y.S.2d 354 (1942), aj'd, 266 A.D. 907, 43
N.Y.S.2d 746 (1943) (where New York law was applied when tort was committed
in New Jersey on ground that plaintiff had arranged in New York for acceptance
of benefactions of defendant).
124. 40 Misc. 2d 1056, 244 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1963).
125. Id. at 1057, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 352.
126. Higgons v. Pratt Inst., 45 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1930) ; Paterline v. Memorial
Hosp. Ass'n of Monongahela City, 247 Fed. 639 (3rd Cir. 1918).
127. Ellsworth v. Brattleboro Retreat, 68 F. Supp. 706 (D. Conn. 1946).
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of others. Agreement as to the inherent invalidity of each of these
foundations for the immunity doctrine is all but unanimous among
the commentators.
128
(a) Trust Fund Theory
Oldest of the grounds for exemption, the trust fund theory, rests
on the thesis that since a charity holds its funds in trust only for
its charitable purposes, payment of tort damages from such funds
would constitute a breach of that trust. Inconsistent with the numerous
judicially recognized exceptions to the immunity rule, this reasoning is
open to an unanswerable query; if "a trust fund is sacred for the reason
generally given, why is it not sacred in every kind of case?" ' 29 More-
over, the duty of a charity to devote its property only to charitable
purposes does not differ from that of a business corporation to use its
property only for the purposes for which it has been organized.' Also,
in so far as a trustee not personally at fault is entitled to reimbursement
from trust funds if he satisfies a judgment obtained against him, trust
funds are accorded only indirect not ultimate immunity.'
(b) Respondeat Superior
In instances where the tort has been caused by an employee, chari-
table immunity has on occasion been predicated on the ground that
the principle of respondeat superior has no applicability to a charity.
The rationale of these decisions is that respondeat superior is a rule of
policy which is justified because the employer obtains profits and
receives the benefit of the acts of his employees.1 2 But because a charity
derives no "profits" the rule therefore has no validity when applied to
such an organization. The error in this reasoning arises from the
assumption that respondeat superior is a function of profit rather than
a derivative of the right to direct, control and select the agent.'83
128. See e.g., Lipson, Charitable Immunity: The Plague of Modern Tort Concepts,
7 CLEV.-MAR. L. R~v. 483 (1958); Posey, Need for Uniformity in Doctrine of
Charitable Immunity, 23 GA. B.J. 398 (1961); Notes, 28 CHi.-KsNT L. Rpv. 268
(1950) ; 38 COL. L. Rev. 1485 (1938) ; 55 DICK. L. Rzv. 392 (1951) ; 49 MICH. L. Rzv.
148 (1950); 37 N.C.L. REv. 209 (1959); 2 Sw. L.J. 244 (1958); 36 U. Dznr. L.J.
636 (1959).
129. Bruce v. Y.M.C.A., 51 Neb. 372, 277 Pac. 798 (1929).
130. Cohen v. General Hosp. Soc. of Conn., 113 Conn. 88, 154 Atl. 435 (1931).
131. Gable v. Salvation Army, 186 Okla. 687, 100 P.2d 244 (1940).
132. Fordyce & McKee v. Woman's Christian Nat. Library Ass'n, 79 Ark. 550,
96 S.W. 155 (1906).
133. Widell v. Holy Trinity Catholic Church, 19 Wis. 2d 648, 121 N.W.2d 249
(1963).
[VOL. 10: p. 71
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1964], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol10/iss1/3
CHARITABLE LIABILITY FOR TORT
(c) Implied Waiver
The implied waiver theory is founded on an implied assumption
of risk of injury or waiver of liability by a charitable beneficiary. By
accepting the charitable benefits or services the beneficiary impliedly
promises not to hold the charity liable for its negligence.
Obviously a fiction, this theory could only pertain to the beneficiary
of a charity and would neither extend to employees or strangers nor to
persons who, because of age or lack of consciousness, are legally in-
capable of making such an implied promise.
(d) Public Policy
Public policy as the basis for charitable tort immunity take several
forms. One is the theory that exemption from liability protects chari-
table assets from use for any purpose other than the one for which the
charity was organized and, as such, is an aspect of the favored treatment
principally applicable to charities.'
The belief that exemption from liability acts as a stimulus to chari-
table activities while liability constitutes an obstacle is another prong
of the public policy argument. It is urged that knowledge that his con-
tribution could be consumed in payment of a judgment resulting from
the negligent conduct of an employee might deter a potential donor." 5
This position loses force when the intention of the charitable donor is
analyzed. Obviously the donor desires to benefit others. Were the
charity not held to some degree of care in rendering its services, the
donor's intention would be defeated. 30
Finally it has been said that "in organized society, the right of the
individual must, in some instances, be subordinated to the public good.
It is better for the individual to suffer injury without compensation
than for the public to be deprived of the benefit of the charity."'3 7  In
other words, the preservation of charitable funds outweighs any right
of the injured person to compensation. Basically this argument arises
from the fear that liability, even in a single case, might destroy the
charity. However forceful this belief may have been in earlier times,
it has become outmoded by changing conditions.
At one period in our history there were few hospitals or other
charitable organizations, and what few there were had minimal assets.
134. Landgraver v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Bd., 203 Ore. 489, 280 P.2d 301
(1955).
135. Michael v. Hahnemann Med. College & Hosp., 404 Pa. 424, 172 A.2d 769,
774 (1961) (concurring opinion).
136. Parks v. Northwestern Univ., 218 Il1. 381, 75 N.E. 991 (1905).
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At that time it might well be that they were entitled to the encourage-
ment and assistance that could be afforded by immunity from liability.
The charitable organization of today is a much different enterprise.
Highly organized and frequently aided by governmental and foundation
funds, modern charity constitutes big business. Hospitals, universities
and religious organizations have extensive assets and endowments, own
valuable property and operate businesses.' The basis for such encour-
agement no longer exists.
The change in the economic status of charitable organizations and
the corresponding lessening of charitable immunity from tort was well
expressed by Mr. Justice Musmanno in his dissenting opinion in
Michael v. Hahnemann Medical College and Hospital,'39 where he
explained that:
[I]t is historically true, and it is a tribute to the soundness
of the human heart that it is true, that there was a time when good
men and women, liberal in purse and generous in soul, set up
houses to heal the poor and homeless victims of disease and injury.
They made no charge for this care. They felt themselves richly
rewarded in the knowledge that they were befriending humanity.
Hospitals then were little better than hovels in which the in-
digent were gathered for the primitive cures available. The wealthy
and the well-to-do were cared for in their homes. The hospital or
infirmary was more often than not part of the village parish.
Charity in the biblical sense prevailed. And if it happened that
some poor mortal was scalded by a sister of mercy, who exhausted
from long hours of vigil and toil, accidentally spilled a ladle of hot
soup on a hand extended for nourishment, there was no thought
of lawsuits against the philanthropists who made the meagre
refuge possible. But if, following such a mishap, litigation should
have been initiated in the courts, it is not difficult to understand
why judges would be reluctant to honor such a complaint, con-
vinced on the basis of humanity, that an enterprise utterly devoid
of worldly gain should be exempt from liability. A successful law-
suit against such a feeble structure might well have demolished it
and have thus paralyzed the only helping hand in a world of un-
concern for the rag-clothed sick and the crutchless disabled.
The situation today is quite different. Charitable enterprises
are not housed in ramshackly wooden structures. They are not
mere storm shelters to succor the traveler and temporarily refuge
those stricken in a common disaster. Hospitals today, to a large
extent, are mighty edifices, in stone, glass and marble. They main-
tain large staffs, they use the best equipment that science can
devise, they utilize the most modern methods in devoting them-
138. Widell v. Holy Trinity Catholic Church, 19 Wis. 2d 648, 121 N.W.2d 249
(1963).
139. 404 Pa. 424, 172 A.2d 769 (1961).
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selves to the noblest purpose of man, that of helping one's stricken
brother. But they do all this on a business basis, and properly
so.... And if the hospital is a business for the purpose of collecting
money, it must be a business for the purpose of meeting its
obligations.1 4
The availability of liability insurance to charities is also a factor
in the tort immunity picture. This eliminates the possibility that a
substantial judgment might compel a small institution to close its door.
Today, it is the "cost of reasonable protection against liability and not
the awarding over in damages of a charity's entire assets" which is
at stake. 4 '
The trend toward a general seeping away of the immunity doc-
trine has grown stronger and gained momentum rapidly in the past
few years.'42 The growing practice is for charitable institutions to
voluntarily obtain liability insurance for the benefit of persons injured
or damaged by torts for which they are responsible.'43
Well on the path to full repudiation, the current of judicial thought
is in the direction of extinction of the doctrine of charitable immunity.
The law in states that persist in clinging to this obsolete principle will
become increasingly riddled with judicial and legislative exceptions that
will chip away the outlines of the rule and undermine its foundations.
Injured or damaged claimants will repeatedly urge the courts to aban-
don the doctrine, and, to escape the rigors of the exemption rule, will
'resort to semantic subterfuges by framing complaints in terms of nuis-
ance or contract rather than negligence. As a result, the law in these
states will become confused and uncertain; a. pattern already apparent
in Georgia,' Maryland,' 45 New Jersey,'4 6 Ohio14 7 and Washington.
14 8
Present social conditions, the interests of justice and the need for
clarification of the law combine to require the judiciary and legislatures
of those jurisdictions which still adhere to this incongruity to relinquish
their wavering hold on this theory and to respond to the needs and
economic realities of our twentieth century society by discarding all
remnants of this crumbling anachronism.
140. Id. at 457, 172 A.2d at 786.
141. President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810
(D.D.C. 1942).
142. Prior to 1942 only six states were considered to have full liability status. See
Note, Charitable Tort Immunity in Michigan, 36 U. DZ'T. L.J. 636 (1959). For the
present status of the doctrihe see sections 1-4 supra.
143. State v. Arundel Park Corp., 218 Md. 484, 147 A.2d 427 (1959).
144. See supra § 4 nn.48-50.
145. See supra § 4 nn.51-54.
146. See supra § 4 nn.36-39.
147. See supra § 4 nn.33-35.
148. See supra § 4 nn.55-59.
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